With regard to unilateral treaties in domestic law, this study develops a general theory of unilateral measures taken years later in cases of nuclear tests (International Court of Justice, 1974, cited in the category Selected cases). In the context of the concepts of stubble and tolerance, the author claims the coherence of State action to support the binding nature of unilateral acts. 65 33 BYIL 11, 15-16 (1957). Of course, there is no known „principle of unjust enrichment“ of any civilized legal system other than prohibition. In Anglo-American law, the term covers a very complex area of law which, for historical and not logical reasons, has been attributed to the usual discussions of the common law of contracts. The term has been appended to certain situations, such as the performance of professional service to a person who is incapable of giving consent (Cotnam v. Wisdom, 83 Ark. 601, 104 p.w. 164 (1907)), the performance of the obligation of a second party by a person threatened with harm by the non-performance of the second party (Sommers v. Putnam Board of Education, 113 Ohio St.
177, 148 N.E. 682 (1925)), and in certain cases where a contract is void by reason of mutual error, the normal rules would lead to: that the entire loss is borne by an innocent party (Vickery v. Ritchie, 202 Mass., 247, 88 N.E. 835 (1909)), so that the court creates a fictitious „contract“ (usually called a „quasi-contract“) between the parties and awards damages to the „poor“ up to the fair value of its services. This is not the place to analyze the use of the concept in detail. In A.L.I. Reformulations, the law of unjust enrichment was codified not in the reformulation of contract law, but in the reformulation of the restitution law (§§ 112-14) (1937). Lord McNair argues in favour of a general principle of law concerning unjust enrichment by the precedent of the Lena Goldfields Arbitration of 1930 (5 YEARS. CREUSER.
1929-1930, Cases 1 and 258), in which the Court held that the existence of rules for disgorging assets to which a party has no equitable right is to be found in English law, French, German and Scottish as a basis for the application of the concept of calculation of damage resulting from a breach of the contract of Soviet Russia. The Court also noted that „ordinary principles of law“ would lead to identical damages. It seems clear that the „unjust enrichment principle“ as used in the Lena Goldfields arbitration is a subordinate and probably unnecessary part of the law on the assessment of damages. The „principle“ does not refer at all to confiscation or unilateral declarations, since the existence of a breach of international law (such as breach of contract in the Lena Goldfields arbitration) is necessary before a question of damage arises, while the binding force of unilateral commitments refers to the fundamental preliminary question of whether there is a breach of law. that is, whether „enrichment“ was „unjust.“ Although the Court did not question the binding nature of the Albanian declaration, it carefully avoided ruling on its precise legal nature. Nowhere in the judgment is it clear whether the Court considered it a bilateral or unilateral obligation. According to the Court, „the Declaration of 2 October 1921 is one of the many international instruments for the protection of minorities“. Footnote 154 At this stage, it is legitimate to ask whether the above-mentioned restrictive standard of interpretation, established by the ICJ and endorsed by the ILC, refers to a finding of law or rather to a substantive provision. Although the ICJ dictum may seem vague at first glance, the context in which it was formulated strongly suggests that the restrictive norm applies at the stage of determining the existence of a legal obligation (legal determination).
It is important to emphasize that the Court`s reference to this restrictive approach comes precisely after it emphasized that „not all unilateral acts imply an obligation“ – strongly suggesting that the relevant norm applies in the context of the initial determination of whether or not a State has expressed its intention to be bound. Footnote 85 Although the wording of Guideline 7 is not very clear, it seems to lead to the same conclusion: the requirement of restrictive interpretation is made in the context of assessing whether a particular act entails obligations.
