The court went on to observe that „the new Order in Council after the date of Sleicher changes the situation before us so significantly that it requires a different result in this case.“ Other effectsIn principle similar to Part III cases? This case appears to be somewhat similar in some respects to the applications made in Part III of the Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1984. Thus, it was found that these particular shortcomings constituted a general failure (not an attempt) to comply with the Marriage Act 1949, so that the ceremony could not fall within its scope. The result was that they were considered „non-marriages“. There are, of course, other conditions for entering into a formal marriage in this jurisdiction, but the place and presence of authorized authorities seem to be the most important in „non-marriage“ cases so far (this is underlined, for example, by the outcome in MA v YES). 1 The conclusion is that, if an invalid marriage was contracted in a country where the court and the official do not have to have a specific marriage licence (or where the conditions for establishing a valid marriage are very weak), it would be easier for the English court to classify the marriage as a void marriage and not a „non-marriage“, as in the present case. Because there are (from an English point of view) less important formalities that must be dropped. Fault by. In fact, in many countries in the Middle East, there is no requirement that the marriage must take place in a licensed venue, and in fact, many valid marriages traditionally take place in private homes (this could also explain why so many non-marital cases in this jurisdiction involve members of our Islamic community getting married in unauthorized places or before unauthorized authorities). 2To further illustrate the importance of the legal system in which the marriage was contracted, Hudson v. Leigh was considered a „non-marriage“ compared to a Christian ceremony (which was considered a blessing rather than a wedding) in South Africa. In this case, however, the ceremony failed at the first hurdle because the court found that the parties never intended or believed it was a legal marriage.
The case reinforces the proposition that, even if the foreign country in which the marriage was contracted considers the marriage to be invalid and incapable of having legal effect or seeking financial remedies, a court of that jurisdiction has the power to decide for itself by reference to English legal concepts: whether the marriage is void or „illegitimate“ – as has happened in this case. The tribunal based its conclusion on the fact that Syria did not have a separate or similar categorization of invalid marriage as a court (as in Burns), and that it was therefore for the English court to classify the nature of the disability and reparation: These contradictory political considerations were discussed [45 Cal. 2d 879] in Sleicher v. Sleicher, 251 N.Y. 366 [167 N.E. 501] and Gaines v. Jacobsen, 308 N.Y. 218 [124 N.E.2d 290]. Ms.
Sleicher`s solemn remarriage was considered an obstacle to her right to receive maintenance from her ex-husband only during the period of remarriage. In Gaines, the court commented on this decision as follows: „At the time of Sleicher, it was impossible for a woman to obtain alimony or other assistance in the event of marriage annulment; It inevitably follows from the theory that an annulled marriage never existed that such a marriage did not give rise to a subsequent maintenance obligation. [Quote.] To rule differently from the General Court in Sleicher would therefore have deprived the wife of any source of support in the present case. (124 N.E.2d 293.) The New York court discussed arguments regarding possible difficulties for the ex-husband in reclaiming his property upon the wife`s remarriage, the discussion, according to my staff, „clearly diverted attention from the validity of the opinion in the Sleicher case and which supports the conclusion here.“ In my view, Gaines should not be interpreted as a disapproval of the rule [45 Cal. 2d 880]. On the contrary, the court noted that „these arguments were of course available to the husband at the time of the Sleicher case, but, as already mentioned, the factual situation has changed considerably in the meantime. In 1929, when the Sleicher decision was rendered, there was no article 1140-a, with the consequence that if the remarriage ended in annulment rather than divorce, no alimony could have been awarded to the second spouse. If the court had found that the wife had also lost her rights under the agreement, she would have received no support. In order to avoid this harsh outcome, the court resorted to the doctrine that annulment refers to the destruction of the marriage from the outset. On June 12, 1953, Mrs. Sefton entered into a ceremonial marriage with one Ross C.
Marble. She then brought an action for annulment of that marriage, invoking as a ground for annulment a type of fraud which would only render the marriage annullable. Marble appeared the same day and agreed that the cancellation could be negotiated as a standard deal. On June 19, 1953, Mrs. Sefton`s marriage to Marble was declared null and void. Thus, while recognizing that it could not alter the assessment of the „validity“ of the marriage by foreign law, the Tribunal held that it was not bound by the characterization of the lex loci or by the related effects (i.e. the remedies) of that invalidity. Similarly, the fact that foreign law in this case (and in Burns) did not have the same concepts of annulment or non-marriage seems to have benefited the applicant: English law could step into the void and determine the remedy.
