Although there are different types of confiscation, the most common legal forfeiture in contract law is order estopel, which protects a person who is now in a situation of economic loss because another party has not acted as promised – even if no formal contract has been formed. Confidence – To invoke the forfeiture of the promissory note, Party B must rely on the representation of its judgment: the High Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to full rent from the time the block was fully occupied after the end of the Second World War. The court held that any attempt to recover the balance of the rent between 1940 and 1945 would be precluded by the doctrine of forfeiture because the defendant had relied on the plaintiff`s promise. Doctrine is a shield, not a sword. The discontinuation of promissory notes is seen as an alternative to the doctrine of consideration. The doctrine of consideration means that a party who has relied on a promise must give something in exchange (a quid pro quo) for that promise. In other words, there must be a contractual agreement between the parties. In The Law concerning Estoppel Representation, 4th edition, 2004, paragraph I.2.2, Spencer Bower defines estoppel by presenting the facts as follows: Proof of harm or possible harm that arises when the promisor is allowed to return to his original promise is required. In Ajayi v. Briscoe (1964) 1 WLR 1326 or where he changes his position because he relies on this promise, although he suffers no disadvantage. In der Rechtssache Alan Co.
Ltd v El Nasr & Import Co. (1972) 2 QB 18, Denning stated that depreciation was not an essential element of the confiscation of the promissory note. Therefore, for a forfeiture objection under the law of obligations to succeed, the promisor`s situation must change. This elementary composition of the Schuldschein judgment was the heart and central subject of discussion in the development of education. The incentive and trust requirement is broadly the same for all trust-based confiscations: there are a variety of different types of confiscation that can occur under English law. It has been found more than once before the courts that the link between them is often weak. Treitel on Contracts notes that „the lack of scruples. is the link between them. Nevertheless, they have „different requirements and different fields of application“.
[1] The courts have generally abandoned any attempt to create a single general ground or principle; in First National Bank plc v Thompson [1996] Ch 231, Lord Millett said: „the attempt. to show that everything stops. are now included in the single, comprehensive confiscation by representation, and the fact that they are all governed by the same principle [has] never found general acceptance. [2] Insurance can be made by declaration or conduct. While representation must be clear and unambiguous, it may result from silence in the case of duty to speak or negligence when a duty of care arises. Under English law, forfeiture by statement of facts is not a legal remedy, although it may be a defence or an action in support of a cause of action. There is some debate as to whether courts under English law will take account of the lack of scruples under estoppel when presenting facts, although Australian courts clearly do so. [3] Promissory estoppel is sometimes referred to as „equitable forbearance“ and is said to have evolved from the doctrine of waiver that occurs when one party (A) voluntarily accepts a request from the other (B) not to comply in the manner stipulated in the contract (see practice note: Estoppel – what, when and how to plead – waiver by estoppel – waiver by estoppel ). A stubble by presentation [of the facts] arises between A and B when the following elements are identified. First, A B, or a group to which B belonged, misrepresents the facts.
[It is not necessary to prove that A knew the statement was false.] Second, A intended or [in the alternative] knew at the time of submission that measures were likely to be taken. Third, B, believing the count, acts to his detriment by relying on representation. [It must have been reasonable to rely on representation.] Fourth, A then tries to deny the veracity of the representation. Fifth, A cannot raise an objection of forfeiture. But the confiscation of property is also born of tolerance. The case of principle in this field is Ramadan v Dyson (1866) LR 1 HL 129. Estoppel is a legal principle that prevents a party from deviating from words or behaviour if another party has responded to either party; In particular, the discontinuation of promissory notes protects those who have acted to their disadvantage on the basis of a promise. This doctrine does not serve to completely extinguish the original rights of the parties arising from the contract. It only provides for the suspension of such a right, which can then be reinstated after a certain event or time.
In Tool Metal Manufacturing v Tungsten [1955] 1 WLR 761 HL, the courts held that a promissory note judgment generally merely suspends statutory rights rather than nullifies them.
